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LIABILITY FOR PRESCRIBING
INTRAVENOUS INJECTION
EQUIPMENT TO IV DRUG USERS
Maxwell J. Mehlman t
IN THE ABSENCE OF WIDESPREAD, publicly sponsored needle exchange programs, the proposal has been made
that physicians prescribe syringes and needles to intravenous
(IV) drug users in order to reduce the risk of infection from HIV
and;other:4is,eases that could result from needle· sharing. One
question is whether physicians who engage in this behavior, as
well as pharmacists who fill the prescriptions, face a significru'lt
threat of.mal_pr~ctice liability if the JV drug user or someone
else, perhaps.an\pnocent bystander, is harmed as a result of the
prescnbed equipnient. No such cases have been reported, perhaps because the pt~ctice is not yet frequent. For the reasons
explained in the analysis that follows, it is unlikely that any
· malpractice suits would be brought successfully in the future.
In analyzing this issue, three assumptions are being made:
First,itis assumed that no state law is being violated by such a
prescribing practice, Including state physician and pharmacist
licensing laws. (If this were not the case, the courts might deem
the behavjor of health care professionals to be negligent per se.)
Second, it is assumed that the he~lth care professional in all
other respects has acted in accordance with the applicable standard of care.· In other words, the physician has properly examined the patient and taken a complete history, has obtained ·the
patient's informed consent when necessary, and has not made
an unreasonable mistake in terms of identifying the patient's IV
drug abuse andcil1 terms of prescribing the appropriate injection
equipment. Similarly; the pharmacist has exercised due care in
filling the prescription. Based on these assumptions, the only
potential basis for liability is the fact that the physician has pre-

t The author is the Arthur E. Petersilge Professor of Law and Director of the
Law-Medicine Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, and Professor of Biomedical Ethics, Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine.
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scribed the IV equipment or that the pharmacist has filled the
prescription. It is not being assumed that the person for whom
the equipilienfis prescrihed is--a; patient of the physician's for
any purpose other than obtruning the prescription for the equipment, although this ceitainly :rllight be the case. (Arguably, a
physician who had a pre-existing relationship with the person
would.he-:_~xenJ_es_s~lik~ly:_to~bJ~~-'"SJJg~dJrticcessfully than a physician whq had nyver ~een-the -pers!;ni1Jefore the visit at which the
prescribing toqk- place, since patients are less inclined to sue
,ghysiciaJ:ls-,w,~~b -who]]]_ tb¢y~:b~ve- 1 6ngoing -relationships, 1 and
since the physician- in such a tylationship could more readily
establish. that she was familiar :With:the patient's drug abuse and
potential for harm from shanng needles.)
':Fi._n~ly; this discussion assl1Ines that the patienJr·fs mentally
competent and Uierefore can be req_sonably expected to comprehend and follow instructions on the proper use and disposal of
the IV equipment. .If this is not the .case, and it may well not be
in the case of some IV drug users, the physician or pharmacist
must take special precautions, such as not providing access to
the equipment unless the pati,ent is under the care of someone
who takes responsibility for the patient, as in a residential
treatment program.
One further point at the outset: The physician or pharmacist
who chooses notto provide access to IV equipment because of
fears ofmalpractice liability also must consider the possibility
of being liable if the drug user is harmed by that decision, such
as by· becoming 'infected with HIV-through needle sharing. In
other words, the potential liability for providing IV equipment
must be compared, not with the absence of liability altogether,
but with the risk of liability created by not providing access to
the IV equipment. (The only way to avoid any risk of liability
_whatsoever might be to refrain from creating patient-physician
relationships with persons who might be IV drug users, which
may be difficult to accomplish for a number of reasons that are ·
beyond the scope of- this paper, not the least of which is the
limited degree t() which physicians in managed care plans can
1

See Berkeley Rice, Where Doctors Get Sued the Most, MED. ECON., Feb. 27,
1995, at 98, 100, 109 (dis,cussing thebreakdown of the doctor-patient relationshlp as
a result of incre.asing litigation); if. CharlesVincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives_ Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609
(1994) (citillg four factors, including poor: corninunication and insensitivity by health
professionals, that contributed to the patient's decision to sue).
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refuse to take on specific patients from among the pool of enrollees.)

I. POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR PROVIDING
ACCESS TO IV EQUIPMENT
The best way to explain ·the potential malpractice risks
from providing ;:tccess to IV equipment for patients who are
drug users is by discussing in turn each of the elements of a
malpractice suit, that is, the points that the patient would have
to prove in order to hold a physician or pharmacist liable.
A. Duty
A physician or pharmacist would only be liable as a professicnial to someone
whom he or she owed a professional duty
of care. As noted above, a physician might avoid such a duty by
refusing to epter into a patient-physician relationship with
someone who ''\\(as a drug user. Assuming, however, that the
physician 'bad agreed to provide professional services to the
drug user, the physi~ian would owe that person a professional
duty of care.
'.

to

B. Injury

In order to hold someone liable for malpractice, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has been injured. In the case
of a physician or pharmacist who provided access to IV equipment to a drug user, several possible injuries are foreseeable:
The plaintiff might allege that, as a result of being given access to the IV equipment, he or she' had continued to abuse IV
drugs and, as a result, had been harmed by the effects of the
drugs (such as by becoming addicted). (ImpEcit in this allegation is the questionable causal proposition that, if the person had
not been given access to the equipment by the defendant, he or
she would not have continued to use the drugs.)
The plaintiff (or a family member) might allege that; as a
result of being given access to the IV equipment, the drug user
overdosed and was killed or injured. (Implicit in this allegation
is the questionable causal proposition that, if the person had not
been given access to the equipment, he or she would not have
overdosed.)
The plaintiff might allege that he or she had been harmed
(such as by becoming infected, continuing to abuse IV drugs; or
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.overdosing) as a result of using the IV equipment that had been
prescribed, although it had not been prescribed for the plaintiff.
For exan1ple; the plaintiff could have obtained the equipment
from llie person'for whoin it had been prescribed. (Again, the
plaintiff impliCitly wo-uid ·be rriaintairung that the harm would
not ba~eoccu.rred had the IV equipment not been prescribed.)
-=-·-tL!!!i!1YL~E~-12laintiff__~<mliL_l:!~3- n<li!:IY gxuKli§!:!r y.rpo .<illeges ~p.jw:ya~·th¢;l'e~u.l~~of F()W,ing into.contact with the equjpmen.t, .s'l.lcll as.becofiiinginfected;following a needle .~tic1c. Sl1ch
a.plailltift:,p;righi)je.. a)~wenfo~c;ement officer, a. garbage collector,-a.-healt4 care worker,
an· innocent "bystander" like a
cl1Tious child \'1/ho- finds the paraphernalia lying in the 'street.
Even ifthe J>lll,intiff ha9 not actually become infected, he or she
might ~~~],t d~ma,ges f<irthe fec.u:-pf becoming infe<;tetlas ~ result

or

o'ttlle'~xj)Hduret'Otlib'fi~k.

·. '· · -·-.

;.. ·- · ··- ·· ··

pven thtmgb these injuries arguably are foreseeable, a
plaintiff \V.gul4 h.ave difficult. tiple prevailing on. the injury issp~, For ·ci.!J:e t]:ring,he ·or. she wop!~ have to persuade the judge
orjury;~ot6rtlythathe.or she had:been injured, but that the injury resulted from the IV equipment that had been prescribed,
rather than from other IV equipment. This may be extremely
difficult toj)rove, since tfie prescribed equipment is not likely to
bear any physicalmarks tbat would distinguish it from other IV
equipment that was obtained illegally.
· Ih ~dditiori~ tll~ iJl~i~tiff wo~ld have to show that the injury
sustail1f!4 w~s not outw~!ghed. by any benefits accruing to him
or her ils-. a ·res~H.oEfu~;'JV equipment having been prescribed~
This is the lega.I-dodtine of "offset." 2 The defendant could argue that, ev~n though the plaintiff had been injured, the injury
was offset bythe benefit of the reduction in the risk of infection
achieved by prescribing the IV equipment. (Even if the court
felt that tbe risks of the injury that occurred were not outweighed completely by the reduction in the risk of infection, the
magmtude of the harm that occurred, and hence the damages to
be awa,r_cled, would be, reduced .by the value of the benefit that
was cpriferred. 3 ) . , :::.

a

2
See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) (limiting damages
when a benefitis conferred upon the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's tortious
conduct).
3
See id; §§ 291, 293 (addressing how an unreasonable risk and the magnitude ofrlsk;respectivety, are deteinrined).

200l]

'LIABILITY FOR PRESCRIBING INJECTION EQUIPMENT

77

Finillly; most courts refuse to pernrit damages ,, to be
awarded merely for being afraid of becoming infected, unless
the individual actually was exposed to an infectious agent, such
as HIV. 4
.
C. "But-For" Causation
· As mentioned in the previous section, the plaintiff not on1y
would'have;to prove injury as the result of the defendant's actions; but that the injury would not have happened if the defen':danFhad riot ~tted. In othei- words, the plaintiff would have to
·prove:thathe or she would have given up or materially reduced IV dfl:ig:·abil~e but-for the prescribed equipment, that he or she
·would<Iidt'h'ave overdosed; thathe or she would not have obtained IV e'quipiiientfroin some· Other source, or that·he ·or she
would n(jthave been stuck by another contaminated sharp instrument:J:he element of "but-for" causation is likely to be ex~e~elY;; diffr~ttlt for t~e plaint~ff to establis~; For example, it is
likelycto:be hard to fmd credible expert' Witnesses who· would
testify '-that soi'neoi1e more probably th<m not would have
stopped'using dnigs if IV equipment ha.d not been prescribed, or
. that addict would not have found equipment from some other
sotuce· with which to take an overdose or to become infected.
A more plausible argument regarding but-for causation
might: be made by someone who was injured by a ne~dle stick,
imdwho could identify the IV drug user, and through their testimo:r:ty; alsoidentify the physician or pharmacist who provided
access ;to the IV drug equipment. This might be the case, for
example, when a law enforcement-officer is stuck by a sharp or
needle in the course of making an arrest. One way for the physi-eiaii 6r phatniadst to reduce the risk of liability in these situations is to instruct the IV drug user about proper handling and
disposal ofthe IV equipment. (Arguably, tliis is required as part
of the physician's and the pharmacist's ordinary duty of care,
although:there are no reported cases inwhich a health ca,re pro-

an

4

SeeJeffrey B. Greenstein, Note, New Jersey's Continuing Expansion of Tort
Liability: Williamson v. Waldman and the Fear of AIDS Cause of Action, 30
RtiTGER.SL.J. 489, 492-493 (1999). For a discussion of this and other restrictions on
claims for "mere exposure to risk," see Scott Burris, Human Immunodeficiency Virus
- /nfededHeiilth Care Workers: The Restoration of Professional Authority, 5 ARCH.
PAM. MED. 102 (1996).

.

..
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fessional has been held liable for failing to provide such information, as result of which someone was injured. 5)

a

D. Negligence
E"V.t!n if the plainti,ff can prove that the prescribed equipmeniwas the but-for cause of the net injury, the plaintiff must
--~sh€J:W~W;~~"~ll~'~q~~en,~1!IlJ7wasnegligent,- that-is,-failed to meet the
applj.c£~;1Jl~ ~t~gii;erqt_c_~e.Physici~ns and pharmacists _are held
't<;i, 1:1,-PTRf~ssion~L~ta,llqa,I"d of care. They are generally expected
Jo;ict~tlie';way,:a,reasonable physician or pharmacist would act in
fli~-~.ame{cii;1(umstancts~: With a few exceptions not relevant
he]."e,>jlldg~i.all&j1llies,determine on the ba[:)is of the testimony
af.e:X£er1'witn~~s~s: wliat behavior meets this standard of care,
~A~-~li$t~~f,~ol.#9t tb@l~~fel)dallt ac;;ted in that manJie'( .
in 6_1-ci~Eto prevail on the issue of negligence, the plaintiff,
via. ~dl.pfirt testimony from physicians or pharmacists, would
hav~ to:·¢dli'Yin¢ethe court that a reasonable health care professioJ1a:l·~~ll-lc.lnothave;prescribed IV equipment in this case. The
defenii~fpresu'illably'would introduce expert testimony to the
conttar)r;:The judge wol!ld apply various legal tests to help deterrrii11e:.W~etlier the. defendant had behaved reasonably.
· On6test;r~flecting the fact that no behavior is completely
freeofri~k;is l;>asicallya comparison of risks and benefits. 6 The
defendant.·W,puid.:}atgli~: -that,- while prescribing IV equipment
perhaps)entmfed.;some:.Hsk of harm to the patient, the risk of
h<l;I;tii W(J:SLGU{weiglj.~d by the expected benefit in reducing the
'risR:'Iir~illfecubif::;{:Note that this test is similar to, but not the
·s~meas', ili6'offset CalCulation mentioned in the earlier discussion qfinjury. There, the issue, resolved on the basis of hindsight, is how much' actual benefit and harm the plaintiff received as a result of the defendant's action. The risk/benefit test
fornegligence instead asks how much benefit and harm a rea.~ CThe:' closest cases involve efforts to hold needle manufacturers liable for
. stickS,; iil·patrbetause<qf the failure to warn health care workers of the risk of infection. See; e.g., Hallleyv: Betton Dickinson & Co., 886 F.2d 804 (6'h Cir. 1989)
(1Tiegical assistmt contracted hepatitis B virus) and Riley v. Becton Dickinson Vascular·Access,.Inc.,-913-RSupp. 879 (1995) (nurse contracted HIV infection). In
Hamley, 1:4~ C()Urt.h~iqt)mtlbe ~anger of a stick was "open and obvious" and thus no
wamif1g, w~s r~qu'li¢d; llowever, a warning might be required for the specific risk of
contr~cti~g hepatiti8'Ji':i'nRiiey; the plaintiff admitted that she was aware of the danger
ofinfection,{Neitheq::ase
resulted
in liability for the needle manufacturer.
'
'' 6 .
' ·... ' . "..
' .
·.
· See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 291.

,.
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sonable person in the defendant's position should have anticipated when he or she decided to act. A defendant who actually
caused net harm to the plaintiff would not be negligent if the
benefits reasonably (although ultimately incorrectly) appeared
to outweigh the risks.)
Even if the plaintiff's experts persuasively testified that
most physicians or pharmacists would not regard providing access to IV equipment-to be reasonable, the defendant would still
not be negligent if the defendant's experts convinced the court
that something ilin to a "respectable minority" of physicians or
pharinadsts wouldhave so acted. 7 In other words, the law recognizes tliat health care professionals must be allowed, within
certain limits, to deviate from the mainstream approach.
One proolem that nright arise, particularly at the very inception of th.~ practice by physicians and pharmacists of providing access to. IV drug equipment, would be that expert witnesses for the def~.Jlse, although testifying that providing access
was.reasoml.l)le,mi'ght admit that no one (except the defendant)
actually did.it. In det~,rmining whether the defendant's behavior
conformed to .the standard of care, the court would face the
disjuncture between how practitioners ought to behave and how
they actually behave. In theory, courts should recognize, and
instruct juries, that the former is the correct test. (In one cele.,.
br~ted case;; Cl co,rirtih effect ruled that the entire profession of
ophthalmology_.. was negligent because no one routinely condl!Ct(!d a glaqcmna test that plaintiff's experts testified was reaso-nable.8} _But .there is always a slight risk that the first practitionerto adqpt a new approach will be_found liable for not following the customary practice of his or her profession. (One
way .possibly to reduce this risk is to inform the patient and get
his or her consent to the fact that, by providing access to IV
drugequip_ment,
the practitioner,
in the patient's interest, is de.
.
parting .from customary practice. This would make the act of
providing the{!Ql1ipment akin to an experiment, with the practitio1}er obtaining the patient's informed consent to participate.)
Finally, even if the plaintiff established that providing access. to IV equipment would be unreasonable in some or even
7

See 1 BARRY R. FuRROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-5(a), at 382-83 (1995)
(explaining that the "respectable minority'' defense permits a physician to adopt a
mode of treatment that reasonable and prudent medical professionals would adopt
under similar circumstances to avoid liability for harm caused to patients).
8
See Helling v. Carey, .519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
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most cases, the defendant could still try to prove that doing so
was reasonablt:dn this specific:: c::;:_u;f!. f()r example, the defendant
could argm~ that, while providmg access ordinarily might not be
reasonable, he or she had taken special care to determine that
providing -access -would be in this patient's best interest and
would not be a, threatto others. Thus, the defendant could point
to~"tl:fe-irre-asure-s'ctaken'f'to""'edueate""'th~c~patient-about proper disposal;i Ck,d.tr S'ome: cases illvolving::an.-overdose using the prescribed>'ecfuipnieri.t~ .the. qefehdaritid:ttight demonstrate that this
partic'Ular- paveiif'was' afsuch' an ·extreme· risk of harm. from using infected·. ne'edles-that devi~ting 'from ordinary practice in the
·
patient's case.wasjustified;
.

--

.·

.·,·.

.- .
~

..

.. .

_E. '_.,Proximate,--;·:·-:Cause
'~: }'"

··.,

._

''Proximate cifuse" is a corifu,sing doctrine that comes into
play wheh th¢ injuiy ·caused by the defendant's negligent behaviori8-tii'Zarie', highl~ attenu~ted, or out of all proportion to
what ·nori:n~tlly )Voura·,'h~-~;?-pected to happen. In these unusual
cases, proxiri:iate ·cal}se pefullts the··.defendant to avoid liability
on the basis -that imposing liability'would be unjust. (An example would·be acaseillwhich acperson negligently tossed a cigarette starling afir~ tliat, whenitburned.down a theater, caused a
dilapidated- section of downtown stores finally to go out of
btis:i'ness; \;t'·suicbtotighf by:tlie- owner ofone Of the stores
againsFthe•'']J.~rsonwh6 thlew•·the: cigarette most likely would
failJotJMk;of:'~J?!!JX_iipate. c;ause,":even though the defendant
was cfearfy~sli:O\viftb"iiave:iJe~hthe;riegligent "but:-for" cause of
the store going out of business.) If the injury caused by providing accds'tO IV equipment was unusual enough, the defendant
could avoid liability eVen though he or she was shown to be
negligent. On the other nand, if the plaintiff can show that the
occurrence of llie irijurywas riot so far-fetched,such as when an
IV drug user overdoses of someone is stuck inadvertently, the
physiCiruFofphartiiacisfwill have to rely on grounds other than
pro:X:iiilatFcalise, sucll~'as' £sserttiig lliaJ there was no negligence
on theitpaf!:~; to '~void b~inili~ble: • ·
Ariother' type :'of ·sitUation in which the doctrine of pro ximate cause riegates li~d)ility i:S when the defendant's actions
have b_een succeeded bY intentional wrongful actions of others
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leading to the plaintiff's injury. 9 Thus, a physician or pharmacist who bad provided access to IV equipment to person A
would not be liable to person B who was injured as a result of
being given the equipment for IV drug use by A with A's intent,
knowledge, or substantial certainty that injury to B (such as
continued use, addiction, or overdosing) would occur.
F. Affirmatiye Defenses
Even if a physician or pharmacist is deemed to have negligently caused injury by providing access to IV equipment, he or
she will not be liable if the plaintiff is found to have assumed
the risk of the injury. 10 Assumption of risk requires that the victim be aware of the risk and knowingly and voluntarily agree to
accept it. A physician orpharmacistwho·provided access to IV
equipment and who educated the patient about the risks of IV
drug use might argue successfully that the patient had been
made aware of the.risks and had assumed them. The physician
or pharmacist· even\might requite the patient to sign a written
statement agreeing to\{efrain from suit if injury should occur,
although it is not certairhthat courts would uphold such a waiver
against the patient. Similarly, in the case of injury to a drug user
other than the person for whom the equipment was prescribed,
the defendant might assert that anyone who uses someone else's
equipment thereby accepts the risk of being injured.
The assumption of risk defense (called an "affirmative" defense because, unless it is raised by the defendant, the failure of
the plaintiff to address ~t does not prevent the plaintiff from recovering) has its limitations, however .. ~ourts sometimes are
reluctant to shield a person from liability for injuries resulting
from negligence even though his or her victim had been warned
about the risks ahead of time. Moreover, as noted at the outset
of this paper, the physician or pharmacist must be reasonably
confident that the IV drug user is competent.
Another affirinative defense is the plaintiff's own negligence. Thus, even if plaintiffs are not deemed to have assumed
the risk, they may still be found to have been negligent by be9

See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 448 (addressing
causal relationship between intentional subsequent wrongdoer and defendant's liability).
10
See id. § 496C (stating that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover when he
voluntarily acts wjth knowledge of the potential risk of harm).
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coming drug users in the first place; by taking an overdose, by
accepting IV equipment. from someone else, or by handling
shaips···carelessly. In~;~a'few;' states·;·this· affirmative defense,
known as "contributory negligence;:' is· a total bar to recovering
damages. Most jurisdictions•, however, adopt a "comparative
negligence" approach; accdtdinfrto which the plaintiff can still
re.c::QYJ~L~Q-W~~_Q~j!g_~_s, but tlie. iu:nou,:ptis reduced in proportion
to the plaintiff's degr~Wof'J~\11t:·'-ctp; some- state's;-Hie·. plaintiff
can only recover~i(.1Jt&r:sJil{.~:i~:)f0.uHd)p be less at fault, or no

moreoi~~:u:~:~:J~~~~~~~!~:N-drug ,users are likely to. be

active participants i11JJie. 'f!.cti:\':ity·whichle.ads to their injury, the
affirinative defenses ofass.ll.mpljQJ1' .c>f risk at!d contributory or
comparative neglig~J[c.~i£~e.;;~~pJ?:Qial,J;x.jiJJportant/reasons ·.why
their suits against physichills·oipi{a,rffiacists who provide access
to IV equipment ate unlikelyh)·bevery successful. The same
defenses may provide~i>rote-~tio.U:fQf.pbysici£1Ps and pharmacists
when the IV equipm~iit: t]'):¢y·p~pvi4e.~<ll1Ses a needle stick to a
health care. worker o_r)i:tw-¢nf()r<;:~ment officer, who arguably
should be aware ofifue,risk, and; who should take proper precautions. to preventhanrito tl:leniselves. Only .if injury occurs to
a truly "innocent byslaiider,?~ sU:chcas a: child in an area like a
playground, would~ t~e·defenses of assumption of risk and the
victim's own neglig~nc:;e..be._ofn_<) ~y<tjL

,· ~- ··.·~fifuiilarj.
It is hitrdly eveript>s~ible;(aiia, for a lawyer, rarely advis'lioildacfcis'lhihuice against the possibility
able) to provide
that a judge or jury somdvhere,on•some set of facts, will find
someone liable .for a given!act. Nevertheless, the risk of liability
for physicians or-pharmacists:who provide access to IV equipment to drug users seemsTemote;The victim may not be able to
establish that the defendantacted negligently. Even if the plaintiff prevails orr theissue·of·J1egligence,jt will be extremely difficult in most. cas~s t();p.rqy~tJI~hfiet,harm has occurred, or that
the net hapn was infact.·c~u.seil:liyr.the.action of the defendant.
Finally, any recovery -would be reduced, if not barred altoliegiigence.
gether, by the victim' s·

an

own
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ll. POTENTIAL LIABILITY·FORFAILING TO
PROVIDE ACCESS TO IV EQUIPMENT
As noted at the outset, health care professionals rarely, if
ever, confront a choice between a course of action that presents
some risk of liability and another that presents no risk at all.
Instead, they face a choicebet\Veen.~,],temative courses of action
where each carries.SOfl1ensk o:fbeing su~d. The.professiona]'s
goal, theref9re, ml}stbe toidentify the <:titemative that presents
the least, or the most~cceptable form of risk..
In deciding whether or not to.· provide access to IV drug
equipment to their patients, the choice is not between the risk of
suit from providing. access versus no risk, but between the risk
of suit from providing access,~d the risk of suit from not providing access. A decision not to provide access to IV equipment
also might cause injury in the form of infection or injuries sustained from obtai.ning and using equipment illegally.
As in the cas~ of suits complaining of injuries sustained
from prescribed. ec:fu.ipment, plaintiffs in suits arising from a
failure to prescribe wb:uld encounter difficulties in attempting to
prove but-for causatioil and injury since they would have to
demonstrate that they would have avoided harm if the equipment had been prescribed. This might be bard to prove if the
evidence showed, for example, that IV drug users continue to
share IV equipment with other users even if their own equipment is 'provided by a physician or pharmacist. Even if a plaintiff could establish the elewents of injury and causation, a judge
or jury might decline to regard a re~sal to provide access as
negligent.
On the other hand, published reports of the success of needle exchange programs in reducing the risk of infection 11 might
persuade courts that plaintiffs were entitled at least to a presumption of causation when physicians or pharmacists declined
11

See, e.g., Thomas J. Coates et al., HN Prevention in Developed Countries,
348 LANCET 1143 (1996) (fmding that cities with low HIV prevalence among injecting drug users made clean syringes available); Don C. Des Jarlais et al., Continuity
and Change Within an HIV Epidemic: Injecting Drug Users in New York City, 1984
Through 1992, 271 JAMA 121 (1994) (indicating that underground syringe exchange was associated with a significant decline in AIDS risk behaviors) ; Peter Lurie & Ernest Drucker, An Opportunity Lost: HN Infections Associated with Lack of a
National Needle-Exchange Programme in the USA, 349 LANCET 604 (1997) (reporting that the lack of a national needle exchange program may have contributed to preventable HIV infection).
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to provide them with access to_ ~'clean'' equipment. As more
physicians and pharmacists begin to provide access, the chances
increase that those who fail- or refuse to do so will be found
negligent.
.
.
In. short, the' physician,
pharmacist contemplating
whether or not to :provide' acces'sfo I,V·equipment must choose
Q~tW~~!tJF9~ (9J:~IQP!~Lfi§,}f~£2,g!!~~~~~L~£tig_n .• H reason~~le
steps. are taken to· 1llitiinrize;:tpe~ J,i§ks posed by prescribed IV
equipment;· 'a· good •· pas~ 'cari'l)~fii{a<i~ drat refusing. to provide
access creates ai 1eastas'ml:lcli'!ifi1Hfm6re, risk of liability than
providing access-to t~e IV equipment

or

._

·.'."'

